Introduction
Structural separation between wholesale and retail functions is increasingly being mandated in telecommunications sectors around the world. Electricity sectors-which share many features in common with telecommunications-have long experience with structural separation, which has commonly arisen as a key element of sector liberalisation. Notably, while integrated electricity operators may have been an artificial "norm" preliberalisation, vertical integration is now rapidly re-emerging-where it has been permitted-in response to failings in wholesale-retail contracts (a necessary concomitant of structural separation). These failings have manifested themselves in poor wholesale price and quantity risk management, problems of adverse selection and strategic bargaining in the presence of asymmetric information and market power, forestalled investment (undermining supply insecurity), and company failures. Research into structural arrangements in the electricity sector increasingly suggests that vertical integration between wholesale and retail functions is the more natural and resilient industry structure. Indeed, vertical integration supports market power and asymmetric information, the importance of the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency, and the relative efficacy of endogenous and regulated approaches to industry restructuring.
In this paper we argue that structural separation in telecommunications suffers from a number of the key problems that complicate contracting in electricity, as well as its own industry-specific problems. Furthermore, we argue that vertical (re-) integration in telecommunications is a preferable solution to problems of wholesale market power, asymmetric information, and of sustaining retail competition, as it is in electricity. It also better supports investment, and hence dynamic efficiency. We also argue that integration-for both electricity and telecommunications-is a preferable contracting solution to interventions such as regulating for contracts . Short-term efficiency gains may be realised from separation, but at the expense of long-term investment and with the risk of unsustainable retail competition. Hence, while the aims of separation are sound, integration may in fact better serve their achievement.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses economic theories of ownership and the boundary of the firm. Section 3 summarises the aims and experience of structural separation and contracting in a sample of restructured electricity sectors, highlighting the features of electricity systems that have complicated contracting. It then discusses the re-emergence of vertical integration in response to these complications, emphasising the features of integration that make it preferable to contracting. Section 4 applies these lessons in the context of selected telecommunications sectors. Common features shared with electricity-as well as those distinguishing telecommunications from electricity-are surveyed. Arguments both for and against vertical integration, as an alternative to contracting, are presented.
Section 5 discusses the resulting policy implications.
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Separation versus Integration-the Theory
Following Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) , transaction cost economics offers insights into why economic activities are organised internally (within firms) or externally (mediated by transactions in markets). 1
Under this approach, economic activities are presumed to be undertaken through market transactions (either spot trading, or longer-term contracting)
unless the costs of such transactions favour internal organisation within firms.
The costs of market transacting include:
• transaction costs (especially with repeated transactions),
• contractual incompleteness and bounded rationality (e.g. when it is hard to predict uncertain demand growth),
• costs of contractual hold-up (parties renegotiating or reneging on commitments, and stranding long-term and/or relationshipspecific investments of their counterparties),
• costs of market power imbalances between transacting parties (especially in the presence of asymmetric information), and
• costs of regulation (such as compliance costs, costs of distorted investment incentives, regulatory hold-up risks, and possibly inefficient pricing).
The transaction costs economics literature also sheds light on why some firm patrons-such as capital providers, suppliers, and customers-are more natural owners of a given firm (Hansmann, 1996) . Ownership of a firm naturally falls to those patrons enjoying the lowest combined costs of 1 For a fuller presentation of our analytical framework, the problems of contracting in electricity sectors, and reasons why vertical integration is emerging as a solution to these problems, see Meade and O'Connor (2009 
Lessons from Electricity Sector Reforms
Historically, electricity sectors in many developed economies were based around either state-owned (e.g. United Kingdom, New Zealand) or privately-owned, regulated (e.g. United States) monopolies, integrating generation, transmission, distribution, and energy retailing. Increasing dissatisfaction with the performance of such integrated firms, combined with a wider shift towards market-based organisation (e.g. through privatisation) and fiscal imperatives, resulted in a re-evaluation of the traditional model.
The development of a new model was aided by technology changes that reduced the minimum efficient scale of generation, as well as by a new economic understanding of how the electricity sector could be re-organised along competitive lines. Such re-organisation would involve some parts of electricity sectors (i.e. generation and retailing) being organised along competitive lines so as to induce efficient pricing and investment decisions, while "natural monopoly" (and "enduring bottleneck") elements such as transmission and distribution would continue to require regulation or other measures to constrain market power or induce efficiencies. The upshot of these developments was a period of electricity sector restructuring in many countries (see Wolak, 1999, and Politt, 2007 , for reviews).
Often, sector restructuring took the form of both horizontal and vertical separation. The former required transmission and distribution activities to be ring-fenced from the potentially competitive activities, to avoid 
Experience with contracting
The experience of contracting in reformed electricity sectors has fallen well short of expectations (see Meade & O'Connor, 2009 , Anderson, Hu & Winchester, 2006 , Chao, Oren & Wilson, 2005 , and Hansen, 2004 many investors relied on high wholesale prices to finance investments in the absence of long-term contracts to provide security, which proved to be to their detriment when wholesale prices fell and gas prices rose (Joskow, 2006) .
Some authors suggest that the natural response to such problems in contracting is to regulate for contracts (e.g. Willems and De Corte, 2008) , or to re-instate retail franchise areas-i.e. retail monopolies (e.g. Chao et al., 2005 , Roques, 2008 , Newbery, 2002 , 2002a . Under these "solutions" greater contract market liquidity would be induced (albeit artificially), or the problem of "hit and run" retail entry would be resolved with the blunt instrument of imposed monopolies. Such solutions are likely to involve welfare loss, and should only be preferred if they involve less loss than other possible alternatives.
Vertical integration as a "natural" solution
However, vertical integration may circumvent the need for harsh generation and retailing were lifted at the same time that retailers were made available for sale, with the consequence that the newly-formed generators and their competitors quickly set about acquiring retail bases. This process was largely completed when the main non-integrated retailer suffered substantial losses when faced with sticky retail prices but soaring wholesale prices in a time of tight hydro reserves in a hydro-dominated system. It was forced to divest itself of its retail customers to generators-the only parties with a natural hedge against surging wholesale prices-in order to stem its losses.
Vertical integration of generation and retailing appears to be a more self-sustaining alternative to contracting-induced or otherwise. Critically, integration internalises wholesale price risks and the risks of market power abuse to the firm. As shown by Hogan and Meade (2007) , so long as integrated firms have balance between their generation and retail load, they do not face incentives to exert market power over wholesale prices. This is because any extra profits they secure at the wholesale level translate into reduced retail-level profits, given that the wholesale price is an input cost to their own retail arm. Conversely, non-integrated generators with market power, or integrated generators with unbalanced generation and load, do face incentives to manipulate wholesale prices.
Since integrated generators have a natural hedge against changes in wholesale prices through self-generation, they can reduce wholesale price risk markedly, facing wholesale volatility only in respect of their relatively small need to transact on wholesale markets to remedy short-term imbalances in their own supply and load. Furthermore, by internalising wholesale electricity price risks to the firm, integrated generators are not as exposed as nonintegrated generators to investment-distorting regulations such as wholesale price caps. 4 They tend also to be larger and more diversified than nonintegrated generators and retailers, further enhancing their advantages in managing price and quantity risks, securing finance, and undertaking largescale investments. Finally, integrated generators face favourable ownership costs relative to smaller, non-integrated competitors, and much reduced market transacting costs.
Together, such considerations mean integrated generators are more "bankable" ventures, with greater financial substance, more secure profit margins over longer time-frames, and natural means to hedge their financing and investment risks. This in turn supports their ability to expand generation and then competitively enter into retail markets.
Integration can be argued to increase entry barriers in retailing, in that it reduces the volume of contracts offered by generators to third parties (i.e.
thins contract markets), and means that retailers also need to invest in generation capacity if they are to compete with integrated generators.
However, this presupposes that retail entry should begin at the retail level.
The counter to this argument is that, by thinning contract markets, integrated generators are less exposed to "hit and run" retail entry (since less contracts are available to such entrants) and the resulting hold-up. Reducing such exposure enhances the generators' ability to underwrite long-term and large, sunk generation investments. This in turn enables them to expand downstream into retail on a more sustainable basis.
The re-emergence of vertical integration in electricity sectors-where it has been allowed, and albeit only in respect of generation and retailingraises important questions about the optimal degree of competition in both retail and wholesale markets. Cut-throat competition in retailing has been regarded as a useful device to reduce retail energy costs. However, the experience in electricity sectors is that such competition results in complications at the wholesale level, where long-term investments and oligopolistic generation are the norm. These problems have served to undermine investment and supply security, thin contract markets, potentially worsen problems of wholesale market power, and undermine the viability of stand-alone retail entry.
Vertical integration, by contrast, does not rely on retail competition to redress any persistent problems of wholesale market power. Instead, it side- Thus, too much competition in retailing can be detrimental to welfare, and oligopoly in generation need not be sub-optimal (given the relevant production technologies) provided generation is balanced with load. Where vertical integration naturally emerges in response to deficiencies in contracting in structurally separated (i.e. de-integrated) sectors, this should
give cause to carefully consider policy initiatives that impose artificial structural separation. The belief that contract markets will efficiently provide the necessary means to mitigate market power, support investments, sustain retail competition and manage price and quantity risks-and do so more efficiently than in integrated markets with a much reduced role for contracting-does not appear to have been borne out in electricity reforms.
Applying the Lessons from Electricity Reforms to Telecommunications
As noted in the introduction, the telecommunications and electricity sectors share many similar features. Some such features are structural-for example, both sectors have "natural monopoly" elements (local access networks in telecommunications are akin to electricity transmission and distribution lines). Much of the current literature on telecommunications focuses on potential problems with-and proposed remedies for-these structural features. For example, some commentators note that an integrated incumbent with natural monopoly power may foreclose competitive retail entry, giving rise to arguments in support of separation as a means of increasing competition (e.g. Cave, 2002 Cave, , 2006 Xavier & Ypsilanti, 2004; de Bijl, 2005) . However, it may be more illuminating to focus on a different set of features that the telecommunications and electricity sectors share-namely, those surrounding asset ownership, contracting, and risk management (see Table 1 ). These features present additional costs of unbundling that the proseparation arguments outlined above fail to take into account.
As Table 1 identifies, significant contractual risks arise in both electricity and telecommunications from a mismatch in investment horizons.
Upstream firms (network operators) have long-lived assets, comprising substantial proportions of fixed and sunk costs, which expose them to risks associated with investment in and ownership of such assets. In contrast, retailers have a shorter-term focus, and can (and indeed via regulation and/or structural reforms are incentivised to) enter the industry with minimal asset holdings and hence minimal investment risk exposure. Under these conditions, a key contractual challenge emerges when new investment is required to increase network capacity (increase generation capacity) and both network (generation) and retail operations face competition.
Of course, as As a result, end consumers were denied the dynamic competitive benefits of earlier bitstream access during the nine months of regulatory negotiations.
Telecommunications markets have not developed the financial markets and contracting instruments anticipated to emerge for wholesale electricity, in part due to the differences in time-dependency-telecommunications capacity, whilst constrained, does not require instantaneous consumption or balancing of supply and demand as in electricity. Thus, there is no direct parallel in telecommunications to the wholesale price risk factors of separated electricity markets.
However, historic patterns of regulatory intervention in access and retail markets have exacerbated hold-up risk problems and resulted in similar behaviour and contractual artefacts. Regulated access agreements encourage 'hit and run' entry by retailers with low entry costs in the first place (Hausman, 2002; Crandall, 2005) , regardless of whether the network operator is integrated with or separated from its retail arm. Whilst regulatory agreements reduce the costs of a network operator contacting with multiple
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separated retail firms (e.g. using standard terms contracts), unless those contracts adequately compensate the network operator for the options granted to retailers to enter and exit (Guthrie, 2006) , then similar contractual weaknesses associated with separation of network operation and retail services in electricity markets will prevail also in telecommunications markets.
In order to induce retail entry, telecommunications regulatory access contracts typically enable entrants to buy network services on a very shortterm basis, replicating the renegotiation risks observed in the electricity market and reducing incentives to invest. Renegotiation risk is further exacerbated by retail regulatory obligations facilitating end-consumer switching, which prevent longer-term customer agreements with retailers that would be necessary for retailers themselves to enter into longer-term contracts with network operators. Constantly decreasing regulated prices based upon hypothetically efficient current (decreasing) network costs further bias entrants towards preferring short-term rather than long-term contracts.
When demand for new network services is already highly uncertain, or there is a very real risk that entrants will use the existing (separated) network to build up market share that is subsequently shifted to their own networks bypassing the incumbent, the incentives for the incumbent to invest in new capacity are even further reduced (Bourreau & Dogan, 2005) . Under such circumstances the more efficient provider would lose market share to the less efficient provider, leading to adverse selection and lower welfare. To restore efficient entry incentives, mandatory separation applying only to the incumbent must therefore also be accompanied by additional regulation imposing a tax (as per Armstrong, 2001 ) on vertically integrated entrants, leading to separation increasing (rather than reducing) regulatory overheads. Given the complexity and extent of transaction costs involved in compensating even for simple universal service distortions (Howell, 2007) , it may be simpler and more efficient to forego vertical separation altogether and instead focus upon providing better incentives to induce competition between more competitively equivalent vertically integrated networks in these circumstances.
Additional regulatory risk accrues in separated telecommunications markets when the network operator is required to offer services on equal terms to all customers, regardless of the identity of the end consumers. Large end consumers (e.g. businesses) may wish to contract directly with the network operator for services, bypassing a retail operator, in the same manner as large commercial electricity consumers may prefer to contract directly with generators. However, this imposes a further level of regulatory intervention/separation in telecommunications markets between network and wholesale services, increasing both the costs of co-ordination and attendant regulatory risk as these contracts too become subject to the same hold-up and gaming risks exhibited in retailer-network contracts.
Vertically integrated firms can internalise hold-up, wholesale risks, and regulatory risks with respect to their own retail operations-the larger the retail market share, the lower the risks and the more likely it is that some (but not fully efficient) investment will occur. 6 However, mandatory separation of retail and network operations precludes any such internalising from occurring. Separation thus increases the investment hold-up risk over access regulation alone, suggesting that, when imposed, separation must also be accompanied by compensatory changes in the terms of regulatory access contracts (e.g. higher returns on capital allowed, locking in entrants to longerterm purchase obligations, imposing bonds on entrants) in order to ensure equivalent investment incentives are offered vis-à-vis the vertically integrated counterfactual. 
Information Asymmetry Risks in Telecommunications
Policy Implications and Conclusions
Reforms in both electricity and telecommunications sectors have been based on the laudable aim of encouraging competition where it has historically been absent, at least in those parts of the sectors amenable to competition. As a means to an end such competition should induce more efficient pricing and investment decisions, at least in a static neoclassical sense. The vertical separation of potentially competitive and non-competitive parts of each sector has often been at the centre of such reforms, relying on contracting and other market transacting between industry components where ownership was no longer permitted. Through such separation greater competition-at least in retail parts of the sector where entry costs are relatively low-is facilitated, and indeed, allowing vertical integration between even the competitive parts of the sector could raise entry barriers that are apparently at odds with reform aims.
The experience of electricity reforms, however, highlights problems in this approach. Not only has the approach failed to perform as expected, but it potentially requires the pursuit of an inferior aim. Indeed, encouraging atomistic competition in retailing when there are scale economies and long-lived, sunk investments in upstream generation has served to undermine both parts of the sector. Hit and run retail entry undermines contracting between retailers and generators, which serves to reduce both retail entry and investment in generation. Vertical integration, by contrast, overcomes the difficulties of contracting and thereby supports both investment, and retail entry. Importantly, it supports downstream entry by generators, rather than the non-integrated retail entry often assumed necessary for successful reforms. In so doing it overcomes the criticism that integration raises entry barriers by forcing retail entrants to have upstream generation-in effect the criticism is misplaced, being predicated on a faulty expectation of how competition durably arises in sectors with oligopolistic upstream competition.
There are key similarities between electricity and telecommunications sectors, as well as telecommunications-specific features which reinforce the problems of contracting in electricity sectors. This suggests that the aim of policy in both sectors should be to support durable competition at both wholesale and retail levels, with realistic expectations as to the extent of likely competition given technological constraints. Indeed, the aim of policy should be to maximise the prospects of such constraints being relaxed, which necessarily requires incentives to be maintained for investments in competing technologies in those parts of the sectors subject to oligopolistic competition.
Technical uncertainty in a non-integrated system can be a source of the problems of contracting; in an integrated system, with competing integrated providers, it can instead be the source of evolving competition.
At the heart of these trade-offs-between encouraging retail competition at the expense of upstream investment (and hence both upstream and retail competition)-are important issues of risk-management. Reforms have often emerged against the experience of investment risks being unduly borne by consumers or taxpayers. The danger now is that reforms have shifted the balance of risk-sharing too far towards investors, which only exacerbates any inherent problems of contracting in separated systems. In turn this excessive imposition of risk on investors undermines investment (and hence the long-term evolution of competition), and creates short-term problems of supply security/adequacy.
Hence, any policies which encourage or result in intense retail competition-at the expense of internalising the problems of investment, risk management and market power mitigation between retailing and upstream activities-may be self-defeating. They risk confusing the means (i.e. competition) with the end (efficient sector evolution). They potentially also undermine efficient risk sharing between investors and consumers, for short term benefits at the expense of longer-term gains. The fact that non-integrated systems based on contracting tend to be imposed, whereas integrated systems often emerge endogenously where permitted, further highlights the inherent attractiveness of integrated over separated structures for both electricity and telecommunications.
